So, talking about "turf" as a factor in new-charity startups, we've tried to delineate the meaning of turf, something of its possible origin, and how it operates in a general way. Now I want to describe some of the deleterious effects I see that this "turf" situation has on a nonprofit's fundraising activity and on the organization's ability to enhance and enlarge its fundraising capacity.
Right from the beginning "turf" allows a proliferation of nonprofits, all of whom want to accomplish relatively the same kind of work, but none of whom want to work with, and especially not work under, any other group like themselves. The effect this has on fundraising is that in the immediate geographic area where the charity is located, among donors and prospects who might be called upon to financially support that nonprofit, the waters become muddied by the proliferation of several, even many, nonprofits, who are all doing the same or similar work.
Questions like "Who do we give to?" or "Who's doing the best, most efficient work?" are increasingly difficult for a would-be donor to answer the more nonprofits there are in a given field. If a donor is trying to ferret out the best way to invest dollars for an anticipated result, the decision becomes more frustrating each year. Eventually, that donor may stop giving, or may choose another cause. The long-term effect is that there are fewer dollars with which to do charitable work, and fewer donors/prospects for whom our work is relevant. After a while, they just don't care and give up. So money is left on the table that could be given to charity, and the nonprofits go begging, have to tighten their belts further.
Another effect of "turf" on the life of a nonprofit is that it makes relying solely on "foundations and fun" (foundation grants and special fundraising events) so much more of a temptation for local charity boards, executives and fundraisers. But the more they rely on foundations and fun, and the less they get involved with individual and family donors, the more these charities find their fundraising options restricted. Therefore, the result is stultified fundraising capacity.
Three strikes and you're out. If you get "turf" operating together with "foundations and fun," and this is, in turn, complicated by a management process that makes repeated decisions against investing in fundraising infrastructure, you have a combination that is certain to provide trouble for the nonprofit. And it is from this troubled position that many charities have contacted me through these last ten years as they need help in extricating themselves from this predicament so they can enlarge fundraising capacity. They're starved for revenue, but they can't make headway because they cannot undo the mindset that led to unidirectional fundraising, that was coupled with non-investment in fundraising. Sort of a vicious circle.
The problem, then, is that the intervention that must be made to rectify the situation is so major, and the changes required are so massive, that the executive and the board may well not hold together through the intervention. I don't think it's any accident that, as the old cliché goes, that "capital campaigns are notorious board cleaners."
I think this happens because in a capital campaign most organizations will employ a fundraising consultant to play a variety of roles. First, there is the feasibility study, which requires a keen and objective view of what community leadership thinks about the organization and its campaign project and goal. Next there is the internal assessment of past and present fundraising practices and results, fundraising infrastructure, and board readiness to support and work hard in the campaign. There is also the training that makes plain the conditions under which nonprofits typically succeed in their campaigns. The result of these rolls played out by the fundraising consultant is an exposed, dead-honest, objective revelation of the organization's fundraising problems in expanding fundraising capacity. Many executives and board alike don't like what they see, and it's not uncommon for many to be asked to leave or simply to jump ship as the campaign swings into action.
I should acknowledge, however, that with the small or start-up nonprofits in their first five or more years of existence, it doesn't have to be a capital campaign that forms the intervention. These charities come to a fundraising consultant because they know something is "out of whack" but haven't the ability, the knowledge or perhaps even the political will to do what has to be done. As a recent client of mine put it in our initial interview, "We know what has to be done, but we have not been doing it. We want you to help us do what has to be done" And so we begin a process of organizational intervention that will undoubtedly have far-reaching implications for every aspect of the organization's life and work.
How does this relate to "founder-itis?" Because the trouble starts with "turf" in the original decision of the founder/executive to start a new charity in the first place, when that new charity is going to duplicate efforts already underway in the community. It is exacerbated by the founder/executive's choice of board members who are not coming on as true governors but simply because they're friends of the founder and are giving use of their name for IRS certification purposes. And it stems from the fact that many founders are either unknowledgeable about or unwilling to invest in fundraising infrastructure at the beginning of the venture and this becomes a habit. So "turf" + "Foundations and fun" + lack of infrastructure investment are major reasons why founder/executives get into fundraising trouble.
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